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ABSTRACT: This paper surveys and critically assesses existing theories of evidence with respect to four desiderata. A 
good theory of evidence should be both a theory of evidential support (i.e., be informative about what 
kinds of facts speak in favour of a hypothesis), and of warrant (i.e., be informative about how strongly a 
given set of facts speaks in favour of the hypothesis), it should apply to the non-ideal cases in which scien-
tists typically find themselves, and it should be ‘descriptively adequate’, i.e., able to adequately represent 
typical episodes of evidentiary reasoning. The theories surveyed here—Bayesianism, hypothetico-
deductivism, satisfaction theories, error statistics as well as Achinstein’s and Cartwright’s theories—are all 
found wanting in important respects. I finally argue that a deficiency all these theories have in common is a 
neglect or underplaying of the epistemic context in which the episode of evidentiary reasoning takes place. 
Keywords: Scientific method; evidence; Bayesian confirmation theory; error statistics; contextualism. 
RESUMEN: Este artículo describe y valora críticamente diversas teorías de la evidencia en relación a cuatro desiderata. 
Una buena teoría de la evidencia debería ser tanto una teoría sobre el apoyo evidencial [evidential support] (ser 
informativa sobre qué tipos de hechos hablan a favor de la hipótesis) como sobre la justificación [warrant]; 
debería aplicarse en las situaciones no ideales en las que normalmente se encuentran los científicos; y      
debería ser ‘descriptivamente adecuada’, esto es, capaz de representar correctamente episodios típicos de 
razonamiento evidencial. Las teorías aquí revisadas—bayesianismo, hipotético-deductivismo, teorías de la 
satisfacibilidad, la estadística del error, así como las propuestas de Achinstein y Cartwright—se consideran 
deficientes en aspectos básicos. Argumentaré que un defecto común en todas ellas es que olvidan, o       
minusvaloran, el contexto epistémico en el que el episodio de razonamiento evidencial tiene lugar. 
Palabras clave: método científico; evidencia; teoría bayesiana de la confirmación; estadística del error; contextualismo. 
1. Introduction 
Peter Achinstein once argued that ‘Philosophical theories of evidence are (and ought 
to be) ignored by scientists’ (Achinstein 1995, title and passim). His reasons were that 
‘such theories propose concepts of evidence that (a) are too weak to give scientists 
what they want from evidence and (b) make the evidential relationship a priori, where-
as typically establishing whether e if true is evidence that h requires an empirical inves-
tigation’. I wholeheartedly agree with (b), and will argue as much below. (a) is, howev-
er, too strong a claim. It is certainly not the case that all existing philosophical theories 
of evidence propose concepts of evidence that are too weak. Some are also too strong, 
and most are both too strong and too weak at the same time. The issue with these 
theories is not that they propose concepts that are too weak but that they propose the 
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wrong concepts: philosophical concepts that have little to do with the needs of prac-
tising scientists.  
 The main aim of this paper is to survey and critically examine existing philosophi-
cal theories of evidence. It will turn out that most accounts don’t even get common-
places such as ‘correlations are (or provide) evidence for causal relations’ right. While 
the main aim is make a critical inventory of what there is, the paper will also suggest a 
way for improvement and thus lay the ground for a more satisfactory theory. 
2. Desiderata 
Before diving into the survey of existing theories of evidence let us lay out a number 
of desiderata any such theory should fulfil in order to have a standard against which to 
judge. To formulate our desiderata it is necessary to first distinguish two different 
concepts of evidence. 
 When we say we have evidence e for a scientific hypothesis h, we may have either 
of two importantly different meanings in mind (Salmon 1975). We might either mean 
that e is a ‘mark’ or ‘sign’ or ‘symptom’ of the hypothesis’ being true, that e is a ‘piece of 
evidence’ for h. The suspect’s fingerprints on the murder weapon, another suspect’s 
incontrovertible alibi, the appearance of a shirt splattered with what turns out to be 
the victim’s blood in the suspect’s laundry basket, an insurance police demonstrating 
that the suspect profits a great deal from the victim’s death each speak in favour of the 
hypothesis that the suspect murdered the victim without constituting (yet) a good reason 
to infer it. This notion of evidence has therefore also been referred to as ‘supporting 
evidence’ (Rescher 1958, 83). I will, more concisely, call it ‘support’. 
 Alternatively, when we say that we have evidence e for a scientific hypothesis h, we 
may mean that we have a ‘body of evidence’ for h that constitutes ‘proof’ that h, that li-
censes h or that e constitutes a ‘(weak, strong etc.) reason to infer’ h. All the pieces of 
evidence just mentioned together constitute a body of evidence which in the right cir-
cumstances may demonstrate that the suspect must be guilty or at least warrant the 
hypothesis to a certain degree. The latter kind of evidence I will call therefore ‘war-
ranting evidence’ or short ‘warrant’. 
 We cannot have warrant for a hypothesis without having support. We cannot have 
a licence to infer a hypothesis without being in the possession of facts that speak in its 
favour. Conversely, it is at least conceivable, and in my view frequently true, that we 
are in the possession of a fact that speaks in favour of the hypothesis without having 
any reason whatsoever to infer the hypothesis. Suppose the second suspect’s finger-
prints are also on the murder weapon. This is no doubt a fact that speaks in favour of 
the hypothesis that the second suspect committed the crime. However, given that (let 
us suppose) there is a good alternative account for the presence of fingerprints and an 
incontrovertible alibi, the hypothesis is not warranted, not even minimally. To give 
another example, a patient’s cough supports the hypothesis that the patient suffers 
from lung cancer but also countless other conditions. The support relation remains in 
place even when there are other facts that (let us suppose) conclusively rule out the 
lung cancer hypothesis. Support is analytically more basic than warrant: we need the 
former to have the latter but we don’t need the latter to have the former. 
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 Support and warrant are related but not identical to the Bayesian notions of incre-
mental and absolute confirmation. According to the Bayesian theory, e incrementally 
confirms h if and only if Prob(h | e) > Prob(h); e absolutely confirms h if and only if 
Prob(h | e) is high. A brief discussion of the base-rate fallacy shows that support is like 
incremental confirmation and warrant like absolute confirmation in some cases. Sup-
pose that a patient is worried that he might suffer from a disease d. There is a really 
good test available, which has a false negative rate of zero and a false positive rate of 
5%. The patient takes the test and gets a positive result (e = positive). What is the 
probability that the patient has the disease given he has the positive result? Many peo-
ple fallaciously argue 95% because they mistake the posterior probability Prob(h | e) 
with the 1 – the false positive rate Prob(e | ¬h). In fact the posterior is much lower. 
Suppose only 1 in 1000 people carry the disease: Prob(h = patient has d) = 0.1%. The 
false positive and negative rates give us the likelihoods: Prob(e | h) = 1 and         
Prob(e | ¬h) = 5%. The posterior probability is given by Bayes’ Theorem: 
Prob(h | e) = Prob(h)*Prob(e | h)/[Prob(e | h)*Prob(h)+Prob(e | ¬h)*Prob(¬h)]  
= 0.001*1.00/[1.00*.001+.05*.999] = .019627 ≈ 2% 
 The positive test result incrementally confirms the hypotheses Prob(h | e) ≈ 2% > 
.1% = Prob(h). But it does not absolutely confirm the hypothesis as 2% is not ‘high’. 
Similarly, a positive test result certainly speaks in favour of the hypothesis and there-
fore supports it but, given these numbers, does not constitute a good reason to infer 
it.  
 More generally, under a sensible assignment of probability functions, (a suitable 
description of) most facts that support a hypothesis will also raise its probability: (an 
evidential statement describing) fingerprints on the murder weapon will raise the 
probability of the hypothesis that whoever left the fingerprints was the murderer, (an 
evidential statement describing) symptoms will raise the probability of the hypothesis 
that the disease is present and so on. Probability raising is, however, at best necessary 
but not sufficient for support: a random individual’s presence near the crime scene 
will raise the probability that she committed the crime but it does not support the hy-
pothesis; the suspect’s murdering the victim will raise the probability that she killed 
him but not support it in the sense of being a mark or symptom for its truth (more on 
this below). 
 Further, while warrant is a notion that admits of degrees: a hypothesis can be 
weakly or strongly warranted, there can be more or less good reasons to infer a hy-
pothesis, there is no reason to suppose that warrant is always quantitative (by which I 
mean measurable on at least a cardinal scale) and can be represented by probabilities.1 
The ‘high probability’ theory of warrant also has some technical problems that I will 
discuss below. The concepts of incremental confirmation and support on the one 
                                                      
1 The idea is that we might be able to rank hypotheses with respect to their degree warrant without the 
numbers we assign to their ranks being meaningful beyond representing their place in the ranking. 
Thus, if we assign (say) zero to ‘no warrant’, one to ‘proof’, 0.4 to ‘weak warrant’and 0.8 to ‘strong 
warrant’, we only know that the strongly warranted hypothesis is more highly warranted than the 
weakly warranted hypothesis; we do not know that it is twice as strongly warranted. 
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hand and of absolute confirmation and warrant on the other overlap, but they are not 
identical.2 
 A good theory of evidence should be a theory of both support and warrant. One 
way to motivate this is by invoking Carnap’s Principle of Total Evidence. Carnap writes 
(Carnap 1947, 138-9): 
A principle which seems generally recognized, [footnote omitted] although not always obeyed, 
says that if we wish to apply such a theorem of the theory of probability [a theorem which states 
the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis with respect to the evidence] to a given knowledge 
situation, then we have to take as evidence e the total evidence available to the person in question 
at the time in question, that is to say, his total knowledge of the results of his observations. [foot-
note omitted] 
 This way formulated, the principle would hardly be practicable. There is no way to 
take all known facts into account when evaluating a hypothesis, neither for an individ-
ual researcher nor for a scientific community. Thus, Carnap quickly appends the prin-
ciple by stating that irrelevant additional items of evidence may be omitted (139). So we 
need criteria of evidentiary relevance: criteria that tell us what kinds of facts we have 
to collect in order to assess a given hypothesis. These criteria are delivered by a theory 
of support.3 
 But we can’t only have criteria of relevance. We also need criteria to tell us how to 
assess the hypothesis, given the facts we’ve collected in its support; or, conversely, cri-
teria that tell us how much support of what kind we need in order to achieve a given 
degree of warrant. In other words, what we require is criteria that translate between 
knowledge of the facts relevant to assessment of a hypothesis and judgements about 
the hypothesis.  
 A theory of evidence that didn’t tell us about support would be impracticable; a 
theory that didn’t tell us about warrant would not be useful. Here, then, are our first 
two desiderata for a good theory of evidence: it should be a theory of both support 
and of warrant. 
 Our third desideratum is that the theory applies to non-ideal cases. Practising sci-
entists often (if not always) have to gather evidence and assess hypotheses in situa-
tions where perfectly controlled experiments and randomised trials are unavailable (for 
whatever reason: technological, financial, ethical) and background knowledge is scarce 
or lacking in reliability. A theory, say, that regarded as evidence exclusively that which 
was produced by a flawless randomised trial would presumably get it right when it ap-
plies, but it would hardly ever apply and therefore not be of much use. A practicable 
theory must be able count as evidence that which has been produced under the condi-
                                                      
2 Similar remarks apply to the ‘qualitative’/‘quantitative’confirmation pair. ‘Support’means ‘positive rel-
evance’or ‘speaking in favour’and is a qualitative concept. However, this does not mean that sup-
port necessarily has to be cashed out in terms of standard qualitative confirmation theories such as 
the hypothetico-deductive theory or satisfaction theories such as Hempel's or Glymour’s. See below 
for a criticism of these theories. I already discussed that warrant comes in degrees but isn’t necessarily 
quantitative. 
3 A fact that speaks against a hypothesis is relevant to its assessment but does not support it. However, a 
fact that speaks against hypothesis h will speak in favour of an alternative hypothesis h´. We therefore 
focus on support and ignore infirming evidence here. 
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tions in which typical scientists find themselves and deliver verdicts on evidence of 
this kind. 
 Lastly, our theory of evidence should be ‘descriptively adequate’. That is, it should, 
by and large, regard as evidence what practising scientists regard as evidence and con-
fer assessments on hypotheses roughly in line with practice. It is clear that most theo-
ries, whether in science or philosophy or elsewhere, are idealised accounts of the facts. 
Moreover, if a theory is to have normative import it can deviate from practice to the 
extent that practice errs (in that, say, it regards as evidence what shouldn’t be so re-
garded or delivers bad verdicts about hypotheses). But these deviations must be excus-
able. For each deviation it must be possible to tell a story why it is either harmless or 
beneficial (because improving on practice) or something similar. 
 In sum, a theory of evidence should: 
• be both a theory of support as well as  
• a theory of warrant; 
• apply to non-ideal scenarios; and 
• be descriptively adequate. 
3. Existing Theories of Evidence 
In this section I will examine how well existing accounts fare with respect to the four 
desiderata I laid out above. Throughout, I will assume that a correlation between two 
variables I and D4 (where, say, I = smoking or I = money and D = lung cancer inci-
dence or D = prices) is evidence for the hypothesis ‘I causes D’, which should be un-
controversial. 
3.1 Bayesianism 
According to the Bayesian theory, 
(BAY) e is evidence for h if and only if Prob(h | e) > Prob(h), 
where e is an evidential statement, h is the scientific hypothesis, Prob(h) denotes the 
probability that h and Prob(h | e) the probability that h, given e.  
 Bayesianism appears to give us a criterion of relevance: to support a hypothesis h, 
collect all and only those facts learning about which raises the posterior probability of 
h. This characterisation makes clear, however, that Bayesianism puts the cart before 
the horse if we understand it as a theory of support. The instruction ‘collect all and 
only those facts learning about which raises the posterior probability of h’ is not one 
that allows us to identify which facts we have to look for to begin with. Facts don’t 
come with probabilities attached. Perhaps, once we have accepted a new fact as evi-
dence for a hypothesis, we will raise its posterior. But we have to know if the fact is 
evidence before we can decide how to adjust our probabilities. 
                                                      
4 I call the variables I for independent and D for dependent variable instead of, say, C and E for cause 
and effect in order to indicate that the causal relation is merely putative. 
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 When a scientists learns a new evidential statement (say, e = ‘The result of the ex-
periment is r’), she must already know whether or not e is relevant to her hypothesis 
and whether it speaks in favour of or against the hypothesis in order to know whether 
her posterior of h on e is higher or lower than or equal to her prior. Change in degree 
of belief is thus an epiphenomenon of evidential relevance (Glymour 1980). The 
Bayesian machinery allows her to form and revise her beliefs rationally, but it silent on 
the question of which beliefs are evidence in the first place. Colin Howson and Peter 
Urbach are thus entirely correct in saying (Howson and Urbach 1993, 272): 
The Bayesian theory we are proposing is a theory of inference from data; we say nothing about 
whether it is correct to accept the data [...] The Bayesian theory of support is a theory of how the 
acceptance as true of some evidential statement affects your belief in some hypothesis. 
 If Howson and Urbach are right, Bayesianism is at best a theory of warrant, not 
one of support. Unfortunately, it frequently gets its assessments of warrant wrong. 
Suppose that background knowledge tells us that learning that I and D are correlated 
(e) raises the probability that I causes D (h) and thus constitutes evidence according to 
the Bayesian theory. The problem is that the correlation between I and D is at best a 
sign of the truth of the hypothesis, not in itself a good reason to infer it. Understood as a 
theory of warrant, Bayesianism is thus too weak, just as Achinstein argues (cf. 
Achinstein 2001).  
 One possible way to fix it is to posit a threshold level x such that e is warranting 
evidence for h iff Prob(h) ≤ x and Prob(h | e) > x. But that will fail, no matter what 
one chooses as one’s x. Take a salient choice, x = .5. Suppose one knows nothing 
about whether or not I causes D. Objective Bayesians would therefore, say, on the 
principle of indifference, assign Prob(h) = Prob(¬h) = .5. In this case, of course, any-
thing that supports the hypothesis also constitutes a good reason to infer it. But this 
would be a mistake. 
 So let’s raise x to, say, .6. Now everything depends on the likelihoods. Suppose 
then that it is very likely that if I causes D, I will be correlated with D: Prob(e | h) = .9, 
and that if I does not cause D, the correlation is rather unlikely: Prob(e | ¬h) = .3. In 
this case, Prob(h | e) = 3/4. Given that the probabilities the Bayesian requires are not 
empirically ascertainable, it will always be possible to rig the numbers in such a way 
that the theory yields the ‘wrong’ result, as it does here. 
 Further, the Bayesian theory yields the wrong result for necessary conditions for a 
hypothesis’ being true which do not support it. If there wasn’t any aflatoxin, the sub-
stance could not cause liver cancer. Thus, Prob(aflatoxin causes liver cancer | aflatox-
in exists) > Prob(aflatoxin causes liver cancer | aflatoxin does not exist) = 0. No bio-
medical scientist would regard the existence of aflatoxin as supporting the hypothesis 
that it causes cancer. (For one thing, the existence of aflatoxin does not speak in fa-
vour of h as opposed to ¬h.) 
 There is also the reverse case but that may be less of a problem. Take two state-
ments h: Aflatoxin is a carcinogen’ and e: ‘Aflatoxin is a potent carcinogen’. Since e en-
tails h, Prob(h | e) > Prob(h) unless the latter is already unity, and Prob(h | e) > x for 
any choice of x < 1. Scientists would probably be loath to call statements such as e ev-
idence for h in either of our two senses. But arguably, the fact that aflatoxin is a potent 
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carcinogen constitutes a good reason for inferring that aflatoxin is a carcinogen—
perhaps the best reason there is. 
 Bayesianism has no problems dealing with non-ideal scenarios, as long as back-
ground knowledge dictates the right probabilities. The following set of probabilities is 
perfectly plausible under a Bayesian account of evidence: Prob(h = ‘aflatoxin is car-
cinogenic’) = Prob(¬h) = .5; Prob(h | e = ‘aflatoxin exposure and liver cancer inci-
dence are correlated’, b1 = ‘e was recorded in an observational study that is potentially 
subject to bias’) = .6 and Prob(h | e, b2 = ‘e was recorded in a well-designed random-
ised trial’) = .9, so that a correlation is evidence for h in both scenarios but stronger 
evidence when it was recorded in an experiment than when it was recorded in an ob-
servational study. 
 There is much debate in the literature about whether or not Bayesianism consti-
tutes an adequate model for scientific reasoning (to mention but three contributions, 
see Howson and Urbach 1993 for a defence of subjective Bayesianism, Williamson 
2010 for a defence of objective Bayesianism and Mayo 1996 for an anti-Bayesian ac-
count of scientific reasoning). Let me discuss just one oddity here. If we know nothing 
at all about hypotheses h = ‘aflatoxin is carcinogenic’ and ¬h = ‘aflatoxin is not carci-
nogenic’, the objective Bayesian will assign them both a weight of .5. (The subjective 
Bayesian can assign any weight at all but the numbers do not matter to my point.) So 
complete ignorance is one way to come up with the judgement that Prob(h) = .5. An 
alternative route is, for example, this. Aflatoxin belongs to a class of substances, most 
of which are not carcinogenic so that (say) the prior probability given only that back-
ground knowledge is .1. But then evidence comes in: aflatoxin exposure and liver can-
cer incidence are correlated in humans; experiments with animal models show that 
exposure causes liver cancer in at least some species; while all observational studies 
(related to this hypothesis) may well be confounded, it has been shown that at least 
some of the possible causes of liver cancer that are endemic in populations exposed to 
aflatoxin cannot explain incidence rates; etc. On the other hand, many animal models 
appear to be resistant to aflatoxin and there is no reason to think that those models 
that are susceptible are better models for humans than those that are not; and there 
remain numerous confounders. Suppose that at the end of the day on the balance of 
evidence Prob(h) = Prob(¬h) = .5. Intuitively, this latter situation where a great deal of 
evidence leads us to assign the probabilities seems to be very different from the situa-
tion where they stem from ignorance. Bayesianism, however, has no resources to dis-
tinguish between the two situations. Scientists do regularly distinguish between having 
positive grounds for thinking that a hypothesis has a chance of being true that is strict-
ly between zero and one and not knowing at all. This speaks against Bayesianism’s de-
scriptive adequacy.5 
 
 
                                                      
5 (Norton 2011) contains a far more detailed discussion of the difficulties Bayesianism has to represent 
ignorance. 
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3.2 Hypothetico-deductivism 
According to the hypothetico-deductivist theory, 
(HD) e is evidence for h if and only if h deductively entails e.  
 Unlike Bayesianism, (HD) tells us what facts to watch out for: those facts a de-
scription of which is entailed by the hypothesis. Unfortunately, deductive entailment is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for support. Causal relations typically issue in (probabil-
istic) regularities but not always. Any given causal hypothesis of the form ‘I causes D’ 
does not, therefore, entail the corresponding regularity or probabilistic claim such as 
‘Whenever I, then D’ or ‘Prob(I | D) > Prob(I)’. Nevertheless, regularities and claims 
about probability raising (typically) support causal claims. Causal hypotheses do, how-
ever, entail existential claims, as we’ve seen above. And as we’ve also seen, the existen-
tial claim is not relevant to the truth of a causal hypothesis. Hypothetico-deductivism 
is therefore not a good theory of support. 
 Hypothetico-deductivism does not distinguish between support and warrant. Sup-
pose that we are in the rare position to have background knowledge b that is strong 
enough such that given this background knowledge, the causal hypothesis h ‘I causes 
D’ does entail the statement e ‘I and D are correlated’.6 Now e comes out correctly as 
speaking in favour of h but—read as a theory of warrant, wrongly—as presenting a 
good reason to infer h. e is not a good reason to infer h because it is possible that e is 
also entailed by alternative hypotheses h´, h´´, h´´´ and so on that are incompatible 
with h (in conjunction with b). Unless the alternatives have been ruled out, e might 
speak in favour of h but it does not speak in favour of h as opposed to h´, h´´, h´´´ and 
so on. We therefore have no good reason to choose h over any of its alternatives. 
 As it is silent on what conditions the implications of h should be observed, it ap-
plies equally to ideal and non-ideal situations.7 Whether the theory is descriptively ad-
equate depends on how it is interpreted. Few scientists will subscribe to a strict read-
ing of the theory according to which a correlation is not relevant to the assessment of 
a hypothesis. On a looser reading of the deductive part of the theory according to 
which the evidence e is given by what a scientist can expect to observe if the hypothe-
sis were true, it may well constitute an accurate description of scientific practice (Reiss 
forthcoming a). 
3.3 Satisfaction Theories 
Hempel’s 1945 satisfaction account of evidence is a development of the idea that an 
instance of a generalisation is evidence for the generalisation. As its main problems are 
                                                      
6 In her 2001 Nancy Cartwright lists the conditions that have to be in place so that causal relations will is-
sue in correlations. My own view is that there are indefinitely many reasons for which I and D can fail 
to be correlated despite the fact that I causes D. So strictly speaking, there is no amount of back-
ground knowledge such that h&b⊢e. 
7 Or rather, as few scientific hypotheses entail any statement about observations on their own, the hy-
pothesis h has to be conjoined with background knowledge b in order to make predictions. But since 
there are no constraints on admissible k’s, one is free to formulate b in such a way as to describe ideal 
as well as non-ideal situations of evidence gathering. 
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well known—the ravens paradox, the grue problem, the problem that statements cast 
in an observational language cannot constitute evidence for hypotheses cast in a theo-
retical language (see Norton 2010 for a detailed discussion)—I will not consider the 
theory it in any detail here. One important issue is that generic causal claims such as 
‘Aflatoxin causes liver cancer (in humans)’ do not appear to be straightforward gener-
alisations of causal claims concerning individuals such as ‘Wei’s exposure to aflatoxin 
caused his liver cancer’. The generic claim can neither be analysed as ‘For all i, i’s ex-
posure to aflatoxin causes i to develop liver cancer’ (because only a minority of those 
exposed will develop the disease) nor as ‘There exists an i such that i’s exposure to af-
latoxin causes i to develop liver cancer’ (because this is too weak: some people die in 
car accidents because they wore a seat belts; but seat belts save lives and don’t cause 
deaths, see Hitchcock 1995; Hausman 2010).  
  A causal generalisation can also be true without being instantiated: ‘Eating one kil-
ogram of uranium 235 causes death’ (Hitchcock 1995: 236).8 Moreover, claims about 
singular causation do not typically constitute evidence for generic causal hypotheses. 
To the contrary, most methods for establishing single-case causal claims require 
knowledge of the corresponding population-level claim (for history, see Scriven 1966; 
for law, Cranor 2011). 
 Clark Glymour’s bootstrapping account (Glymour 1980) aims to improve upon some 
of the weaknesses in Hempel’s theory. One of the problems of Hempel’s satisfaction 
theory was that it doesn’t let us use statements about observables provide evidence for 
hypotheses concerning unobservables. Glymour’s account repairs this defect by allow-
ing the use of theory in interpreting evidence. Roughly, 
(BOOT) e is (supporting) evidence for h with respect to theory t if 
   (a) e and t entail an instance of h; 
   (b) there exists alternative evidence e´ such that e´ and t entail ¬h in an  
        inference analogous to that of (a). 
Condition (b) is there to ensure that e plays any role in the derivation of h. (a) on its 
own can lead to a trivialisation of the condition when the evidence e plays no role in 
entailing h because to contains h. 
 (BOOT) doesn’t easily apply to the support of causal hypotheses. Causal hypothe-
ses are not simple generalisations from causal claims about individuals, as we have 
seen above. That I causes D in individual i may or may not mean that I causes D in the 
population p from which i was drawn. If i suffers from a rare genetic condition that 
makes wine poisonous for him, it may both be true that ‘Drinking red wine in moder-
ate amounts causes ill health in i’ and that ‘Drinking red wine in moderate amounts 
causes good health in p’. 
 Moreover, background ‘theory’ is never strong enough to entail, together with the 
evidence, an instance of the generalisation. Here ‘theory’ would refer to all the back-
                                                      
8 According to Nancy Cartwright for ‘I causes D’ to be true it is enough that some I’s cause D’s (e.g., 
Cartwright 1989). This has the somewhat awkward consequence that (for instance) both ‘Seat belts 
save lives’and ‘Seat belts kill’are true. Even if we accept this, this theory does not help with unin-
stantiated generic causal claims. 
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ground knowledge necessary to ensure that the evidence (such as ‘Peter’s cough 
stopped after taking the medicine’) entails the instance of the hypotheses (‘Peter’s 
cough was relieved by the medicine’). This would mean we have made sure that there 
exists no other reason for which Peter’s cough may disappear except the medicine. Of 
course, there are always open-ended lists of factors that may compete with a cause in 
bringing about an effect.9 
 I should mention that there is an approach in econometrics that seems to be repre-
sented well with Glymour’s bootstrapping method: the structural or Cowles Commis-
sion approach. Here specific forms of econometric models are derived from theory 
and confirmed using correlations between variables of interest. Evidence plays a cru-
cial role in deriving an instance of the hypothesis because it gives values to parameters. 
Confirmation is not trivialised because it is always possible that a parameter the hy-
pothesis describes as positive or negative turns out to be zero. 
 Structural econometrics is very controversial within economics, however. The 
‘theory’ that is used to interpret data is highly disputed, and so econometricians tend 
not to regard others’ estimations (the estimations of those who use different bits of 
theory) as credible.10 Thus, even if the bootstrap theory rationalises one approach 
within econometrics, little is won. Bootstrapping is generally inapplicable to the    
support of causal hypotheses. 
 Let me look at an alternative account, one implicitly given by Mill’s methods. Mill’s 
methods are of course not designed as a theory of evidence. However, they do address 
our two questions: What kinds of facts do we have to collect in order to support a (in 
Mill’s as in our case, causal) hypothesis? What constitutes a good reason to believe or 
act on a hypothesis? Consider for instance the method of difference, which he de-
scribes as follows (Mill 1874[1843]): 
If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it 
does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the 
former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an 
indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon. 
 To find out whether I causes D, Mill tells us to look for a situation in which D ob-
tains and a second situation in which it does not obtain but which is otherwise identi-
cal in all respects except, possibly, one. If there is a factor with respect to which the 
two situations differ, then it is an effect or a cause or an indispensable part of the lat-
ter. The evidence is thus for a weaker disjunctive hypothesis but further evidence, for 
instance, about temporal order or an application of Mill’s method of agreement, can 
rule out the unwanted alternatives. 
 Mill’s theory belongs to the family of satisfaction theories because an instance of a 
(causal) generalisation confirms the generalisation. If, say, we find in a controlled ex-
periment that, in the context, some factor I makes a difference to an outcome D, we 
                                                      
9 Even if we were to weaken the relationship between evidence, theory and hypothesis instance to one of 
‘partial entailment’, the problem would remain that causal hypotheses are not generalisations of in-
stances of causal claims. 
10 For a discussion of the debate between structural econometrics and the opposing ‘design-based’econ-
ometrics, see Reiss (forthcoming b). 
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not only infer that I caused D in this case but regard the causal generalisation I’s cause 
D’s as confirmed.11 
 In addition to the problem that generic causal hypotheses are not straightforward 
generalisations of singular causal claims, a main issue troubling Mill’s theory is that it 
works only under ideal conditions. If we can find or create two situations that differ 
only in cause and effect, then we have a good reason to accept a causal hypothesis. But 
there aren’t many hypotheses for which it is likely to find evidence of this kind. To 
begin with, no two situations are ever exactly alike (except with respect to cause and 
effect). Any application of the method requires judgements of causal relevance. 
Whether or not two situations in fact are ‘relevantly’ alike and how reliable our judge-
ments concerning this matter are depends on the domain at hand and the state of our 
knowledge about it. Mill knew well that the method isn’t universally applicable. Here 
is what he says about some of the domains in which we are interested here (Mill 1948 
[1830]): 
But this can seldom be done in the moral sciences, owing to the immense multitude of the influ-
encing circumstances, and our very scanty means of varying the experiment. Even in operating 
upon an individual mind... we cannot often obtain a crucial experiment. The effect, for example, 
of a particular circumstance in education, upon the formation of character, may be tried in a vari-
ety of cases, but we can hardly ever be certain that any two of those cases differ in all their cir-
cumstances except the solitary one of which we wish to estimate the influence. In how much 
greater a degree must this difficulty exist in the affairs of states, where even the number of rec-
orded experiments is so scanty in comparison with the variety and multitude of the circumstances 
concerned in each. How, for example, can we obtain a crucial experiment on the effect of a re-
strictive commercial policy upon national wealth? We must find two nations alike in every other 
respect, or at least possessed, in a degree exactly equal, of everything which conduces to national 
opulence, and adopting exactly the same policy in all their other affairs, but differing in this only, 
that one of them adopts a system of commercial restrictions, and the other adopts free trade. 
This would be a decisive experiment, similar to those which we can almost always obtain in ex-
perimental physics. Doubtless this would be the most conclusive evidence of all if we could get it. 
But let any one consider how infinitely numerous and various are the circumstances which either 
directly or indirectly do or may influence the amount of the national wealth, and then ask himself 
what are the probabilities that in the longest revolution of ages two nations will be found, which 
agree, and can be shown to agree, in all those circumstances except one? 
 We need a theory of evidence that works for non-ideal cases, cases of the kind Mill 
describes here. The problem with Mill’s methods is that they are completely silent 
about what we learn in non-ideal scenarios. When they apply, Mill’s methods give us 
warrant of the highest degree, or as Mill calls it, ‘the most conclusive evidence’. But 
surely we learn something from comparing two countries that are very much (but not 
completely) alike or from comparing many countries that differ with respect to a large 
range of (but not all) factors. 
                                                      
11 Another way to classify Mill’s theory would be as a forerunner of Mayo and Spanos’error-statistical 
approach (see below). After all, Mill’s controlled experiments are designed to make sure that the same 
outcome would, in all likelihood, not have been produced if the causal hypothesis were false. That 
could only happen if another cause of D was present in the test situation and absent in the control, 
but overlooked. Controlled experiment are designed in order to avoid just that. What matters here are 
the characteristics of Mill’s theory, not how we best classify it. 
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 My remarks on the descriptive adequacy of Mill’s theory are exactly the same as 
those concerning the hypothetico-deductivism. A strict reading of Mill’s theory can 
hardly be descriptively adequate because it is not practicable. A looser reading of the 
theory can be regarded as underwriting controlled experiments and is therefore ade-
quate to all those areas of science in which controlled experiments are used. 
3.4 Error Statistics 
Deborah Mayo and Aris Spanos’s error statistical account of evidence is informative 
about what facts to gather in support of a hypothesis. The core concept in the account 
is that of a severe test. Mayo defines it as follows (Mayo 2000, S198; notation slightly al-
tered for consistency with mine): 
Hypothesis h passes a severe test with e if (i) e fits h [for a suitable notion of fit or distance] and 
(ii) the test procedure T has a very low probability of producing a result that fits h as well as (or 
better than) e does, if h were false or incorrect. 
The word ‘fit’ from the first clause is a statistical notion but Mayo intends something 
weaker. In other publications she and Spanos say ‘agrees’ instead of ‘fits’ (e.g., Mayo 
and Spanos 2010: 22). Presumably, a correlation between I and D—recorded in an ob-
servational study or as a result of a randomised controlled study—fits or agrees with 
the hypothesis h: I causes D. The second clause is the crucial one. The test procedure 
must be designed in such a way that if h were false—I did not cause D—then the 
probability that it would produce a result like e would be very low. The error-statistical 
view of evidence thus distinguishes sharply between the methods by which evidence e 
is generated. An observational study TO might not control for all common causes that 
may be responsible for the association between I and D. TO therefore does not have a 
low probability that it produces a result that fits h as well as e (the correlation) does if a 
common cause is responsible for the association. By contrast, a well designed experi-
ment TE will control for this possibility and thus have a low probability to produce a 
result like e. 
 Only data produced by a virtually flawless procedure receives the honorific ‘good 
evidence’ according to Mayo (op. cit.): 
Data e produced by procedure T provides good evidence for hypothesis h to the extent that test T 
severely passes h with e. 
Like Mill’s, the error-statistical view collapses support and warrant into one concept—
or at least Mayo doesn’t tell us what to do with data that are not produced by severe 
tests. The problems are therefore analogous. If we are in the lucky position to know 
that e was produced by a severe test, the error-statistical view correctly identifies e as 
relevant to h and, equally correctly, as a good reason to infer h. However, a correlation 
recorded in an observational study, a non-severe test, would, incorrectly, not be re-
garded as evidence at all. And that is certainly mistaken, both normatively and descrip-
tively.12 
                                                      
12 Admittedly, Mayo defines only a sufficient condition for a severe test in the quotation above which 
suggests that there are other ways for a test to be severe than the one she describes. (Though at times 
she does include ‘and only if’, see for instance Mayo 2005). Moreover, in joint work with Aris Spanos, 
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3.5 Achinstein’s Theory 
In his Book of Evidence Peter Achinstein explicitly aims to address challenge of develop-
ing an account of evidence that is relevant to scientific practice. He identifies two 
main problems with the philosophical theories he examines—Bayesianism, hypotheti-
co-deductivism and satisfaction theories à la Hempel 1945: they characterise a concept 
of evidence that is too weak for scientific purposes and they regard the evidential rela-
tionship as a priori. 
 We have seen in what senses these theories build on a weak concept of evidence: 
what these theories regard as evidence is at best support for a hypothesis, but it does 
not constitute a good reason to infer the hypothesis. To develop his own theory, 
Achinstein defines four concepts of evidence: potential, veridical, ES (epistemic-
situation), and subjective. Potential evidence is the most basic and important concept. 
He characterises it as follows (Achinstein 2001, 170; notation slightly changed for 
consistency with mine): 
(PE) e is potential evidence that h, given [background information] b, only if 
  1. Prob(there is an explanatory connection between h and e/e&b) > ½ 
  2. e and b are true 
  3. e does not entail h. 
 There is an explanatory connection between h and e whenever either (i) h correctly 
explains why e is true, (ii) e correctly explains why h is true, or (iii) there is a hypothesis 
that correctly explains why both h and e are true. Veridical evidence adds the clause 
that (iv) h is true. ES evidence is relative to an epistemic situation and states that e is 
ES evidence whenever e is true and everyone in the epistemic situation believes that it 
is veridical evidence, and subjective evidence requires a subject X to believe that e is 
veridical evidence and take e as the reason to believe h. 
 Achinstein’s theory is at best one of warrant. This is intended as Achinstein thinks 
of evidence as a ‘good reason to believe’. He does not think that one needs a separate 
concept of relevant or supporting evidence (ibid., 74): 
Accordingly, I reject the ambiguity response. Even if probabilists were correct in supposing that 
there is a sense of evidence that involves the idea of increase-in-strength-of-evidence, and even if 
the latter is connected to probability, it does not follow, and indeed is false, that any increase in 
probability is an increase in the strength of the evidence. 
 His main argument is that evidence is a threshold concept. For a hypothesis to 
have any acceptability or firmness, its probability must exceed some threshold. Just as 
adding one person to a group of people does not turn a non-crowd into a crowd, in-
                                                                                                                                         
she emphasises that ‘test’may refer to a series of studies rather than a single, highly controlled proce-
dure (Mayo and Spanos 2010, 25): 
 Although it is convenient to continue to speak of a severe test T in the realm of substantive scientific infer-
ence... it should be emphasized that reference to “test T”may actually, and usually does, combine individual 
tests and inferences together; likewise, the data may combine results of several tests. To avoid confusion, it 
may be necessary to distinguish whether we have in mind several tests or a given test –a single data set or all 
information relevant to a given problem. 
 To my knowledge, this suggestion is never worked out, however. 
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crementally increasing the probability of a hypothesis does not constitute a (good or 
otherwise) reason to believe the hypothesis. 
 I fully agree that it ‘is false, that any increase in probability is an increase in the 
strength of the evidence’. But it does not follow that there is no concept of evidentiary 
relevance or support. Tons of facts can be put on the table as supporting evidence for 
a hypothesis before a rational person is obliged or licensed or may feel encouraged to 
believe or act on the hypothesis. Supporting evidence is given by all the facts that are 
relevant to the assessment of a hypothesis. The outcome of this assessment is entirely 
independent of the status of the facts as relevant. And this concept of evidence is not a 
threshold concept. There is an intuitive sense in which adding relevant facts that speak 
in favour of a hypothesis strengthen it. However, the strength of evidence does not 
generally increase linearly with the number of facts that speak in favour of the hypoth-
esis (perhaps weighed by the strength with which they speak in favour of it). Rather, 
there is a certain structure to evidential support, a structure which is missing from 
both Achinstein’s and the Bayesian accounts. 
 Be that as it may, we should ask about the virtues of Achinstein’s account as a the-
ory of warrant. Achinstein adds the requirement that there be an explanatory connec-
tion between evidence and hypothesis in order to rule out cases where e is irrelevant to 
the assessment of the probability of h and the posterior of h is already high. The prob-
ability that Michael Jordan will not get pregnant (h) is high, given our background as-
sumption that he is a male (b); whether or not he eats Wheaties (e) is irrelevant. And 
yet, Prob(h | e&b) > ½, which would mean that e is evidence for h under a pure high 
probability account (145ff.). Obviously, that Jordan eats Wheaties does not explain 
why won’t get pregnant or vice versa, and so e is not evidence under Achinstein’s ac-
count. 
 His theory therefore requires not that the posterior of h on e be greater than one 
half but the posterior of there being an explanatory connection between h and e, given 
e be greater than one half. This addition, however, introduces new difficulties. 
 It is often stated that causal relations explain correlations. There is certainly an in-
formal sense in which this is true: one reason for two variables being correlated is that 
they are causally connected; the variables can be correlated because one causes the oth-
er. However, beyond this intuition it is hard to say precisely in which sense a causal re-
lation explains a correlation. Correlations are mathematical constructs and therefore it 
is not the case that causal relations cause correlations. It is not clear, to say the least, 
that the hypothesis that I causes D is unifying. What are the diverse sets of explananda 
that can be derived from the hypothesis? If the causal relation is very robust in the 
sense that I causes D in many different populations and under very diverse sets of 
conditions, then the hypothesis may well be unifying, but it is entirely consistent with 
a causal hypothesis that the conditions under which it operates are highly restrictive 
and local. Further, there are many more reasons for which the two variables can be 
correlated: selection bias, certain statistical properties of the variables, conceptional, 
logical and mathematical relations between the variables, measurement error and so 
on. These different reasons are certainly not all equally unifying. 
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 There is, to be sure, something like an inferential relationship between a causal hy-
pothesis and a statement of a correlation: if we accept the causal hypothesis we can in-
fer that the variables will (probably/likely/possibly) be correlated. Inferential relations 
are only sometimes explanatory, however. Observing a drop in the barometer reading 
I can infer that there (probably/likely/possibly) will be a storm but the drop in the ba-
rometer reading does not explain the storm. To find a criterion between explanatory 
and non-explanatory inferences was a problem logical empiricism struggled to solve 
for much of its existence, and I will not try to solve it here. 
 So there is at best an intuitive sense in which a causal hypothesis explains a correla-
tion—the existence of a causal relation constitutes one reason among many for the ex-
istence of a correlation. Even if we accept this, the requirement that there be an ex-
planatory connection between h and e is too strong. Evidence relevant to the assess-
ment of a hypothesis is often very remote. Suppose you read a study purporting to 
show that I causes D. For all you know, the study was well designed, so if there really 
is a correlation between I and D—as the study reports—you will have a good reason 
that I does indeed cause D. However, it is part of your background knowledge that the 
team of researchers responsible for the study tends to be a bit sloppy when it comes 
to using spreadsheets, so you’re not so certain that the correlation they report really 
exists in the population from which the data are drawn. But then you hear from an 
acquaintance that the team has taken criticisms of earlier episodes of sloppy spread-
sheet calculations very seriously and installed a rigorous replication system where their 
results are independently calculated by two teams of graduate students. Now, in the 
present circumstances this piece of information will provide a good reason to infer the 
causal hypothesis and thus constitute warrant. But it neither explains nor is explained 
by the causal relation between I and D, nor is there another hypothesis that explains 
both this piece of information and the causal relation. The requirement of explanatory 
connectedness between evidence and hypothesis is too strong.13 
 Achinstein might think that his second clause helps with this problem. The clause 
requires that the evidential statement e and background assumptions b be true. After 
all, if I and D only appear to be correlated because of a coding error in the spreadsheet 
used, the statement ‘I and D are correlated’ is not true and therefore not (potential) 
evidence according to the theory. 
 However, to require that the evidential statement e (and background assumptions 
b) be true introduces at least two new problems. First, neither evidential statements 
                                                      
13 One might argue that the piece of information is not evidence as such but rather part of the back-
ground information b that helps to determine P(‘there is an explanatory connection between h and e’
| b) > ½, where h is the causal hypothesis and e a sentence describing the correlation. (Thanks to an 
anonymous referee for this suggestion.) The problem with this reading of his theory is that 
Achinstein doesn’t give us a criterion to determine what counts as relevant background knowledge. 
Certainly the explanatory connection does not give us relevance. Perhaps anything that helps to raise 
P(‘there is an explanatory connection between h and e’| b) to over ½? But how would we know this 
probability if we don’t already have a concept of evidence (which Achinstein doesn’t give)? At any 
rate, the piece of information described above is evidence but Achinstein’s theory doesn’t regard it as 
such. 
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nor background assumptions wear the label ‘I am true’ on their sleeves. For a theory 
of evidence to be practicable, we should only use conditions in the definition of evi-
dence that are relatively readily ascertainable. If we don’t, we might never be in the 
position to know that we do have evidence. While there is always the possibility of er-
ror in applying the definition, knowing that the conditions apply should not in princi-
ple be inaccessible. To ascertain that e and b are true is, however, beyond the average 
scientist’s (or anyone else’s) grasp. 
 Second, it is not always clear whether an evidential statement is true or not, even 
ignoring epistemic considerations. Once more, take correlations as an example. There 
is, to my knowledge, no generally accepted definition of what a correlation is. There 
are definitions of various correlation coefficients but it would be a mistake to think 
that two variables are correlated if and only if, say, the Pearson correlation coefficient 
is (significantly? at what level?) different from zero. Why use the Pearson coefficient 
and not any of the others? More substantially, there is a controversy over whether or 
not two non-stationary time series (i.e., time series whose moments such as mean and 
variance change over time) are correlated. Kevin Hoover argues they are not, I argue 
that they are (Hoover 2003; Reiss 2007). The facts about which both parties agree are: 
(1) Xt and Yt are two non-stationary time series, (2) the Pearson correlation coefficient !X,Y ≠ 0; (3) X and Y are not causally connected. Is our evidential statement e = ‘X, Y 
are correlated’ true or false? 
 Something similar happens when the data are created by inadvertently conditioning 
on a common effect of the two variables through, for instance, selection. Suppose that 
I and D are causally and probabilistically independent in the general population. Sup-
pose also that they have a common effect. Both I and D are conditions that make 
people see a doctor. If we look at data coming exclusively from doctors’ records, we’ll 
find I and D correlated. Thus, the two variables are uncontroversially correlated, 
though in the wrong population. One might try to solve this particular problem by re-
quiring that the evidential statement contains information about the population (‘I, D 
are correlated in the relevant population’) but it will hardly be possible to operational-
ise the concept of ‘relevant population’. 
 From the scientist’s point of view it is insignificant whether evidential statements 
are true or not. If a study claims that two variables are correlated, then that’s the evi-
dence. There may be tens of reasons for the result other than a direct causal relation: 
confounding, selection bias, non-stationarity, mismeasurement, coding errors, fraud, 
to name but a few. To be justified in inferring the hypothesis presupposes having con-
trolled for these errors. There may be a meaningful distinction between those errors 
that obtain when the correlation is genuine but not indicative of a direct causal rela-
tion (e.g., confounding) and those that obtain when the correlation is not genuine to 
begin with (e.g., mismeasurement, coding errors) but, as I have argued, it is somewhat 
blurry and not consequential for the inference from evidence to hypothesis. 
 To the extent that scientists use evidence that is not explanatorily connected with 
the hypothesis, Achinstein’s account is not descriptively adequate. In favour of the ac-
count speaks its ability to deal with a range of non-ideal scenarios. 
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3.6 Cartwight’s Argument Theory 
Nancy Cartwright defends an ‘Argument Theory’ of evidence according to which 
(Cartwright forthcoming, 13-14):  
An empirical claim e is evidence for an empirical hypothesis h just in case e is an essential premise 
in a sound argument for h, that is, a valid argument with true premises. 
 This view on evidence is no doubt influenced by Cartwright’s recent work on evi-
dence-based medicine, policy and practice. Why, one might ask for instance, is a corre-
lation produced by an randomised controlled trial (RCT) evidence for a causal hy-
pothesis? Here is a sketch of an argument (Cartwright 2007, 13-14): 
To test ‘T causes O’ in φ via an RCT, we suppose that we study a test population φ all of whose 
members are governed by the same causal structure, CS, for O and which is described by a prob-
ability distribution P. P is defined over the event space {O, T, K1, K2, …, Kn}, where each Ki is a 
state description over ‘all other’ causes of O except T. [Footnote omitted] The Ki are thus maxi-
mally causally homogeneous subpopulations of φ. Roughly 
• ‘Ki is a state description over other causes’ = Ki holds fixed all causes of O other than T. 
• ‘Causal structure’ = the network of causal pathways by which O can be produced, with their 
related strengths of efficacy. 
Then assume 
1. Probabilistic theory of causality. T causes O in φ if P(O/T&Ki) > P(O/¬T&Ki) for some sub-
population Ki with P(Ki) > 0. 
2. Idealization. In an ideal RCT for ‘T causes O in φ’, the Ki are distributed identically between 
the treatment and control groups. 
From 1 and 2 it follows that ideal RCTs are clinchers. If P(O) in treatment group > P(O) in the 
control group in an ideal RCT, then trivially by probability theory P(O/T&Ki) > P(O/¬T&Ki) 
for some Ki. Therefore: if P(O) in treatment group > P(O) in control group, T causes O in φ rel-
ative to CS, P. 
 According to the Argument Theory, a correlation between T and O is evidence for 
the hypothesis that T causes O only relative to an argument such as the above and the 
truth of its premisses. Formulated this way, the theory looks very harsh indeed. When 
would we ever be in the position to have evidence for a hypothesis? When would we 
be able to tell? 
 The paper from which the long quotation is taken distinguishes between ‘clinchers’ 
and ‘vouchers’ among methods for warranting causal claims. The former prove a hy-
pothesis, given the assumptions (and are, consequently, narrow in their range of appli-
cation), the latter speak in favour of the hypothesis without demonstrating it (and are 
broader in their range of application). An RCT is an example of a clincher, and so are 
certain econometric methods, Galilean experiments and derivation from established 
theory. Examples for vouchers are the hypothetico-deductive method (in its positivist, 
not its Popperian reading), qualitative comparative analysis, or ‘looking for quantity 
and variety of evidence’ (6). 
 The Argument Theory effectively denies that there are vouchers. Or, to put it 
more agreeably, the Argument Theory allows results produced by vouchers to count 
as evidence only to the extent that they have been converted into clinchers. How does 
one convert a voucher into a clincher? By adding strong inductive principles such as 
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premiss 1 from the quote above. Suppose that we have recorded a correlation in an 
observational study. We might make the correlation vouch for a causal hypothesis hy-
pothetico-deductively: the HD-method says that an observation we would expect to 
make were the hypothesis true speaks in favour of the hypothesis; if the causal hy-
pothesis were true, we’d expect the variables to be correlated; thus, to record the cor-
relation speaks in favour of the hypothesis. 
 Not according to the Argument Theory. Under that theory, we would have to 
write down an argument such as the following: 
1.´ For any two variable X and Y, if X and Y are correlated, then they are ‘causal-
ly connected’. 
2.´ Two variables X, Y are causally connected if and only if X causes Y, Y  causes 
X or a set of third factors Z causes both X and Y. 
3.  I and D are correlated. 
4.  D does not cause I. 
5.  There is no set of factors Z such that Z causes both I and D. 
6.  Therefore, I causes D. 
 The problem is that general principles such as 1. or 1.´ are false. A counterexample 
to 1.´ we’ve seen above: two non-stationary time series can be correlated and yet not 
causally connected. Perhaps we can avoid this problem by assuming weaker principles. 
After all, we only need a bridge between probability and causality in this case, not for 
any set of variables in any circumstance. Thus: 
1.´´ If I and D are correlated, then they are ‘causally connected’,  
where by I and D I am referring to the independent and dependent variable in this case. 
There are no reasons to believe that local principles such as 1.´´ could never be true. 
But what could be positive reasons to believe that they are true? Obviously, any rea-
son to believe that any of the various non-causal accounts of correlations is absent. If 
we know that I and D are not correlated because they are non-stationary time series, 
because they are conceptually or logically or mathematically related or because they 
have been measured by conditioning on a common effect (and so on), then we have 
reason to believe that they are causally connected. According to the Argument Theory, 
to have evidence for a premiss such as 1.´´ means to have another argument with that 
statement as a conclusion. Perhaps: 
7. If I and D are correlated, then they are ‘causally connected’ or there is a non-
causal reason for the  correlation. 
8. No non-causal reason for a correlation applies to I and D. 
9. Therefore, if I and D are correlated, then they are ‘causally connected’. 
 The problem with premisses such as 8. (as well as 5.) is that the list of non-causal 
reasons for which two variables can be correlated is open-ended. Assuming these 
kinds of premisses for the purposes of arguing in favour of a hypothesis therefore al-
ways involves an inductive risk. No reformulation of episodes of inductive reasoning 
as formally deductively valid arguments could change that fact. 
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 Cartwright demands that inductive arguments be reformulated as deductive ones in 
order to make explicit the principles on which these arguments are based—to force 
researchers think hard about reasons for using this or that principle in the given case 
and to know where potentially invalid steps in the inference lie. However, while the 
Argument Theory forces one to explicate one’s inductive principles (such as 1., 1.´, 
1.´´, 7. or ‘If observed swans 1 through 333 have been white, then all swans are 
white’), it also hides important issues behind principles and statements about individu-
als assumed to be true. Take statement 5.: ‘There is no set of factors Z such that Z 
causes both I and D.’ Such a statement cannot be proved, just as the statement ‘There 
are no unicorns’ cannot proved. The best we can do is to rule out the set of known 
and relevant factors. What is known and what is relevant differs from case to case. 
The Argument Theory glosses over such case-specific differences. 
 How does the Argument Theory fare with respect to our four desiderata? First, 
support. Cartwright writes (Cartwright forthcoming, 14):  
To figure out whether e is evidence for h, the Argument Theory guides you to look for good ar-
guments connecting e and h. Of course it doesn’t tell you how to tell if an argument is good. But 
that’s not in its job description. Coming up with an argument is part of the ordinary normal sci-
ence job of scientific discovery. To check that it is valid, perhaps one needs a good logician or a 
good mathematician. To tell if the premises true, we employ the normal methods available in the 
paradigm in which we work for assessing the kinds of claims the premises make. 
 This is just like the Bayesian would answer: ‘To figure out whether e is evidence for 
h, the Bayesian Theory guides you to look for statements e that are such that the prob-
ability of h on e is higher than the probability of h. Of course it doesn’t tell you how to 
tell if a statement does raise the probability of h. But that’s not in its job description. 
Coming up with statements that do is part of the ordinary normal science job of scien-
tific discovery.’ My arguments about Bayesianism therefore apply here too. 
 On the other hand, once we do have a good argument in favour of a hypothesis, 
we have in fact proved it (relative to the truth of the premisses) and therefore have a 
(somewhat coarse) way of assessing the hypothesis. Further, as long as we can come 
up with inductive principles that connect the evidence with the hypothesis, there are 
no a priori constraints about what can count as evidence. The theory therefore applies 
to non-ideal scenarios or any scenario at all. Scientists certainly use induction when 
reasoning about evidence without being able to formulate explicit inductive principles 
that can be used to write down deductive arguments every time. The Argument Theo-
ry is therefore at best an idealisation of practice or, more likely, to be understood as a 
revisionary rather than descriptive account. 
4. Analysis 
All the theories of evidence considered here play down at best but more often ignore 
the role the context of an inquiry plays in the determination of what kinds of facts are 
relevant to the assessment of a hypothesis and to how it is to be assessed. Let me dis-
cuss three contextual factors here: factual background commitments, the purpose of 
the inquiry, and normative commitments. 
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4.1 Factual Background Commitments 
This is certainly a truism but in my view underappreciated by standard philosophical 
theories of evidence: what’s evidence in favour (or against) a hypothesis is dependent 
on how the world works and our knowledge thereof. M’s fingerprints on the murder 
weapon would not be evidence that M committed the murder if our fingers (as well as 
our hands, toes and feet) didn’t have friction ridges or if the friction ridges weren’t so 
varied as to allow individual identification. Nor would they be evidence if dactylo-
scopy hadn’t been developed in the late 19th century. The same is true of evidence for 
scientific hypotheses. Relations of actual causation (such as killings) issue in typical 
markers and so do generic causal relations. That, for instance, causal relations are typi-
cally stable under intervention and can therefore be investigated experimentally is a 
contingent fact about causal relations that has to be discovered. Similarly, that a two-
slit experiment produces the phenomenon of diffraction is evidence for the wave the-
ory of light only because of facts about how other kinds of waves behave and our 
knowledge of these facts. 
 According to John Norton’s ‘material theory of induction’, ‘All inductions ultimately 
derive their licenses from facts pertinent to the matter of the induction’ (Norton 2003, 650; origi-
nal emphasis). What Norton says here about induction is, subject to a caveat, true of 
evidence as well. Whether or not a thing is evidence for a hypothesis depends on facts 
pertinent to the matter of the hypothesis. The caveat is that whether or not a thing is 
evidence for a hypothesis does not only depend on those facts. It also depends on our 
knowledge of these facts and other contextual factors (which I will discuss below). 
 To be sure, some standard frameworks include places for background knowledge. 
Bayesianism, for instance, is more accurately formulated like this: 
(BAY´) e is evidence for h given b if and only if Prob(h | e, b) > Prob(h | b), 
and hypothetico-deductivism like this: 
(HD´) e is evidence for h given b if and only if h & b deductively entails e, 
where b signifies background knowledge. However, in these and other theories it is 
never worked out just how background knowledge affects the status of a thing as evi-
dence and, in particular, how changes in background assumptions can result in chang-
es of the status of a thing as evidence. 
 Background knowledge in my sense will help with defining what the support of a 
hypothesis is, for instance, because it is informative about its empirical content. 
4.2 Purpose 
Another fairly trivial observation about the context of an inquiry is that the purpose of 
the inquiry makes an important difference to both relevance and hypothesis assess-
ment. It is one thing to establish that someone committed the crime; quite another, to 
establish it in such a way as to convince a jury and comply with legal standards. An il-
legally taped telephone conversation may be compelling evidence in the former case 
but not constitute evidence at all in the latter; conversely, the defence might come up 
with certain outré alternative accounts of the defendant’s behaviour for whose elimi-
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nation evidence must be collected, facts that are likely to be entirely irrelevant outside 
the court. 
 How unusual alternative hypotheses can be for them to remain worthy of consid-
eration is itself a question that the purpose of an inquiry helps to settle. If the aim is to 
establish a scientific hypothesis, there is usually no need to rule out sceptical alterna-
tives such as evil-demon hypotheses. Michael Williams calls the injunction to ignore 
sceptical hypotheses in a scientific (or everyday) inquiry a ‘methodological’ constraint 
of the context because violating it would mean to change the nature of the debate 
(Williams 2001, 160). If, in the course of establishing whether I causes D we consider 
the hypotheses that the correlation between I and D was brought about by an evil de-
mon, we no longer pursue a scientific question but a philosophical one. Similarly, a 
presupposition of any historical investigation is to suppress worries whether the Earth 
even existed five minutes ago. To allow that possibility would be to stop investigating 
historically (ibid.). 
 The audience to be addressed matters too. It is one thing, for instance, to establish 
the law of the free fall for oneself as it were, as Galileo did. It is quite another to es-
tablish it in a way that would be acceptable to the Aristotelian. By and large, Aristoteli-
ans did not accept Galileo’s thought experiments, for instance, and would counter 
them with reports of observations of actual falls of bodies of different weights (Shea 
1972, 11).14 
 Another sources of context-dependency that relates to the purpose of the investi-
gation has to do with the ambiguity of scientific hypotheses. Take again causal hy-
potheses. A generic causal hypothesis of the form ‘I causes D in population p’ is am-
biguous in various ways. The following a some uncontroversial ways in which a causal 
hypothesis is ambiguous: 
• Component vs net effect. A variable I may raise (in the causal sense) D’s probability 
along one route and lower it (also in the causal sense) along another. I is a compo-
nent cause and preventer at the same time. I’s net effect on D may then be posi-
tive, negative or zero. Knowing I’s component and net effects can both be useful 
information, but in different contexts. Suppose I is smoking and D heart disease. 
Smoking is said to cause heart disease. Suppose also that smokers tend to exercise 
more, perhaps because they know of the negative (component!) effects of smoking 
and wish to compensate. Finally, suppose that the net effect is negative, because 
exercise is a strong preventer of heart disease. In this scenario, we can use smoking 
as a predictor of heart disease and, for instance, predict that as numbers of smok-
ers decline, heart disease incidents should go up. But it would hardly be a prudent 
strategy to recommend to people that if they want to reduce their chances to get 
heart disease they should start to smoke. In this case the component effect is the 
                                                      
14 Perhaps the Galilean case is one of evidentiary standards that vary with metaphysical background as-
sumptions, in this case the assumption that reality is articulated in universal and stable modes about 
which we learn best when they are as free as possible of ‘accidents’(local, idiosyncratic factors) and 
which was rejected by Aristotelians (McAllister 2004). A metaphysical background belief is a contex-
tual feature too, of course. 
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appropriate quantity and the right recommendation would be to smoke less and ex-
ercise more often.15 
• Unanimous vs average effect. In a randomised trial, we learn about the average effec-
tiveness of treatments. When a treatment is effective on average across all subpop-
ulations, it is possible that the effect has the opposite sign for some subpopula-
tions. This cannot happen when the effect is ‘unanimous’, which means that it has 
the same sign for all subpopulations. If I has an average positive effect on D, then 
raising I will lead to an increase in D in the population. But this does not mean at 
all that giving I to an individual will have the beneficial effect, if that individual 
happens to be in one of the subpopulations where I has the opposite effect. 
Knowing I’s average effect on D is thus certainly useful for prediction, but it is 
controversial whether the average effect alone can underwrite population policies, 
and an average effect should certainly not be the only basis for an individual rec-
ommendation. 
• Necessary vs sufficient cause. Causes almost always need other conditions to bring 
about their effects: matches do not light when struck unless oxygen is present in 
the air; venoms are toxic only in animals with certain genetic make-ups and when 
no antidote is present; development aid is effective only to the extent that the aid-
receiving government is not too corrupt and the right kinds of socio-economic in-
stitutions are in place. The absence of each of these necessary causes (and equally, 
the absence of each of the other necessary conditions) will explain the absence of 
the effect. Only the whole amalgam of conditions will bring about the effect, how-
ever. If bringing about an effect is the purpose, we therefore need a sufficient or, as 
Mill says, a ‘real cause’ (Mill 1874[1843], Book 3, Chapter 5, §3). 
 It is not hard to see that the different interpretations of ‘cause’ in the causal hy-
pothesis that are adequate in the light of the different purposes discussed above re-
quire different kinds of evidence (for details, see Reiss 2009, 2012). 
4.3 Consequences and Normative Commitments 
Scientific inquiry doesn’t come for free. There are direct costs, ethical costs and op-
portunity costs. Even if it were the case that experimental studies are always more reli-
able than observational studies, this would not mean that the former are always pref-
erable to the latter. Experimental studies are nearly always more financially and ethi-
cally costly than analogous observational studies, and if the consequences of making a 
mistake in the assessment of a hypothesis are small, it may well be better to forgo the 
additional reliability.  
 That value judgements affect scientific research is widely argued (for an overview 
of the arguments, see Reiss and Sprenger forthcoming). The gathering of evidence 
(which includes decisions about what information to seek, how to seek and how long 
to seek) and the assessment of hypothesis in the light of the gathered evidence are   
                                                      
15 To the extent that that is possible. If the exercise variable cannot be manipulated independently, smok-
ing more may well be the best strategy to prevent heart disease. 
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examples of kinds of scientific activity that are affected by value judgements. Im-
portantly, these kinds of scientific activity are affected by value judgements in a way 
that the epistemic dimensions cannot neatly be separated from the pragmatic dimen-
sions of a problem (cf. Kitcher 2011, 31ff.). Clearly, then, it is norms and values that 
help to determine the degree of warrant a hypothesis enjoys. 
 Nancy Cartwright sees the entanglement of the epistemic and pragmatic dimen-
sions of hypothesis assessment clearly. It is worth quoting her in full (Cartwright 
forthcoming, 13): 
Consider: You are about to endorse a claim to a graduate student whom you know is readily in-
fluenced by you and is considering taking a position in a research group that uses this claim as a 
central pillar for its research. Before endorsing this claim in these circumstances, you should con-
sider the evidence for it. You should also consider the abilities of the research team that propose 
to follow it up, the opinion of your colleagues about the evidence and what it shows, the talents 
of the student, the chances that she will end up with publishable papers even if the research pro-
gram does not produce its promised results, and so forth. These issues will not separate nicely, as 
we might have hoped, to afford a two-stage deliberation: first wear your scientist's hat to estimate 
the degree to which you are justified in ‘accepting’ the claim; then consider how justified you are 
in using a claim with that degree of warrant in the way proposed. Rather you must consider the 
issues all together in one fell swoop. And you should consider them. What you say to the student 
matters to her life, so you should take pains to ensure that what you do is justified. But that is not 
an exclusively scientific enterprise. 
 Her ‘Argument Theory’ of evidence appears not to be suited to the joint considera-
tion of epistemic and pragmatic issues ‘in one fell swoop’ she describes in this passage. 
Even if the theory is only meant to be one of relevance and not of assessment or ‘war-
rant’, one cannot help but feel that a hypothesis which is supported by a deductively 
valid argument with true premisses has as much warrant as there can be. 
5. Conclusions 
My last remark concerning Cartwright’s Argument Theory generalises to all theories of 
evidence considered here. Most or all of what I said in Section 4 are well-known ob-
servations about the importance of context in scientific inquiry. But while well-known, 
standard theories of evidence (and non-standard theories such as Cartwright’s) fail to 
acknowledge them and integrate them into the theoretical framework. What we need 
is a contextualist theory of evidence. 
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